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Employment Protection and Takeovers 





Labor restructuring is a key driver of takeovers and the associated synergy gains worldwide. 
In a difference-in-differences research design, we show that major increases in employment 
protection reduce takeover activity by 14-27% and the combined firm gains (synergies) by 
over half. Consistent with the labor channel behind these effects, deals with greater potential 
for workforce restructuring show a greater reduction in volume, number, and synergies. The 
reforms do impede layoffs, and the associated wage costs match the magnitude of synergy 
losses. Offer prices are not fully adjusted, with both bidders and targets exhibiting lower 
returns following the reforms.  
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Cost reductions in the pursuit of economies of scale and scope are commonly believed to be a 
major driver – and a key source of synergies – in corporate takeovers (see, e.g., Houston, 
James, and Ryngaert (2001) and Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009)). 
Eliminating overlapping or inefficient operations is often the primary channel through which 
such gains are obtained. For instance, Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011) report that 
19% of acquired plants are closed, and a further 27% are sold off in the three years following 
the merger. Restructuring the workforce, and, in particular, laying off redundant white- and 
blue-collar workers, should come hand in hand with such organizational changes. 
Anecdotally, employment considerations are a contentious issue in many takeovers and 
mergers. For example, when the U.S. pharmaceutical firm Pfizer made a takeover bid for its 
British-based rival AstraZeneca in 2014, the deal fell through in part due to the U.K. 
government’s opposition based on concerns that the acquisition would result in a significant 
reduction in the firm’s research and development personnel in the U.K.1  
Despite these anecdotes and the intuitive relevance of labor force issues to mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), there is little systematic empirical evidence on the importance of labor 
restructuring as a driver of the market for corporate control and as a source of merger 
synergies. This is partly because one does not have good ex-ante measures of the potential for 
workforce restructuring. For instance, actual ex-post changes in employment following 
mergers suffer from omitted variables and measurement problems (e.g., can capture changes 
in the investment opportunity set or changes in strategy independent of the deal). Our paper 
fills this void and provides the first systematic evidence on the link between labor 
restructuring and takeovers. Specifically, we exploit cross-country and time-series variation 
																																								 																				
1 “In Drug Mergers, There's One Sure Bet: The Layoffs”, The Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2014. 
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in employment protection to evaluate the importance of workforce restructuring as a driver of 
takeover activity and related economic outcomes. 
Intuitively, the potential for labor force restructuring is expected to affect takeover 
dynamics in several ways. First, if workforce restructuring represents an important 
consideration in takeovers, then fewer takeover attempts are likely to materialize when 
employment is highly protected and redundancies are costlier.2 Second, where bids are made, 
the rigidity of labor regulation is expected to reduce the synergy gains from mergers and 
acquisitions. If this is the case, offer premiums and bidder and target performance may also 
be affected. 
As a prequel to our main analysis, we begin with a simple cross-country test and show 
that the national level of employment protection explains a large part of cross-country 
differences in M&A activity. We then turn to a difference-in-differences research design 
exploiting major employment protection reforms across a panel of 21 developed economies 
and show that employment protection changes have statistically significant and economically 
large effects on the market for corporate control. We begin by showing that the number of 
takeover deals drops by almost 15% in response to major employment protection increases. 
Similarly, deal volume drops by almost 30%. These effects are consistent with workforce 
restructuring being a major driver of corporate mergers and acquisitions, in line with the 
neoclassical, efficiency-seeking motive of takeovers (Gort (1969), Jensen (1993), Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)). 
We then show that, following major employment protection increases, the combined 
firm cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around merger announcements decline by two 
percentage points, relative to the unconditional combined firm CAR of 2.4%. In an efficient 
																																								 																				
2 Note that this can be either a direct consideration of the deal, i.e. pure workforce optimization, or an indirect 
consideration, whereby the combined firm may be consolidating or closing down a plant or other overlapping 
facilities as a result of the deal and needs to lay off the associated workers. 
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stock market, the value change of the merging firms in response to deal announcement can be 
interpreted as the expected synergy gain brought about by the combination. The magnitude of 
our estimate indicates that labor force restructuring represents as much as much as 80% of the 
typical takeover efficiency gain immediately priced by the market (50% when compared to 
the average combined firm CAR in the pre-treatment period for the group of countries 
experiencing reforms). 
We further explore how bidders and targets respond to these changes in the availability 
of synergy gains and examine offer premiums, target returns, and bidder returns. We find 
that, in response to tighter employment protection, offer premiums are reduced by about 11 
percentage points, or roughly a third of the unconditional average of 33.8%. While the target 
CARs decline in line with the premiums results, we find that the bidder CAR is also 
significantly reduced. This suggests that, although bidders reduce offer prices following 
increases in employment protection, they do not adjust them enough: both bidder and target 
shareholders share in the decline in synergy gains.  
Our main results are robust to the usual methodological concerns, such as pre-treatment 
differences between treated and control firms, omitted variables (for instance, 
contemporaneous reforms in areas other than employment protection), and reverse causality. 
For instance, we show that, for each of the outcomes, there are no discernible effects of the 
labor reforms in the years prior to their passage, and a permanent effect immediately 
following the reform. We also demonstrate that the reforms tightening employment 
protection are not passed in response to deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals that 
could potentially have a negative effect on the takeover market.  
To further address the omitted variables concern we exploit cross-sectional differences 
in terms of potential for workforce restructuring and establish heterogeneous treatment 
effects that are consistent with the labor channel. We show that increases in employment 
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protection reduce the incidence of bidder-target combinations with a high degree of business 
overlap (domestic intra-industry deals) and lead to an incremental 3 percentage point 
reduction in the combined CAR as compared to deals with little business overlap in the same 
country and year. We also show that increases in employment protection are associated with 
a greater reduction in takeover activity and synergy gains for targets with larger productivity 
gaps relative to their industry, in sectors with greater average workforce turnover following 
mergers, and in mature sectors. Importantly, these latter tests on combined firm CARs 
include country-year fixed effects, which eliminates any time-varying heterogeneity between 
the reforming and non-reforming countries. Moreover, any alternative explanation for our 
results would have to predict the same exact cross-sectional effects along these four different 
dimensions.3  
Finally, to cement the labor force channel interpretation of the documented effects, we 
study the effect of mergers on employment, and the effect of employment protection reforms 
on post-merger workforce restructuring. We show that mergers do reduce combined firm 
employment, but stronger employment protection reforms are associated with a smaller 
reduction in the combined firm workforce following mergers. The difference-in-differences 
estimate of the effect of employment protection reforms on post-merger workforce 
restructuring suggests that such reforms preserve about 7% of employment at the combined 
firm on average. Moreover, we are able to reconcile the present value of wage savings 
associated with this estimated employment effect with the magnitude of the estimated 
changes in synergies, which further reinforces the labor channel interpretation of our main 
results. 
																																								 																				
3 Reverse causality, whereby takeover activity affects employment protection, is also an unlikely explanation for 
our findings. The most plausible reverse causality story, whereby politicians anticipate increased takeover 
activity and tighten labor protection to preserve employment, predicts a positive association between 
employment protection and takeover activity. Our results show the opposite. 
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The results we document survive a battery of further robustness checks. The effect of 
employment protection reforms on the market for corporate control does not change 
significantly with the inclusion of the post-2008 period characterized by diverging economic 
fundamentals. Similarly, the results are unchanged when we exclude U.S. firms: the 
phenomenon we document is a worldwide one. The results are also robust to the use of 
alternative measures of employment protection and to inclusion of a number of political 
economy controls. Finally, both positive and negative changes in employment protection 
move the outcomes in the expected direction; the effect of increases in employment 
protection is particularly large.  
Our paper belongs to the growing literature on labor economics and finance. This 
literature was propelled by Botero et al. (2004) who study the regulation of labor around the 
world and its effects on various economic outcomes such as labor force participation and 
unemployment. Among the more recent work, Hombert et al. (2014) analyze the effect of 
unemployment insurance on entrepreneurial activity. Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2014) 
show that family ownership and unemployment insurance are substitutes in providing job 
stability to workers. Giroud and Mueller (2015) identify the effect of leverage on 
employment via the corporate balance sheet channel. Tate and Yang (2015) show that inter-
industry human capital transferability explains corporate diversification patterns and labor 
productivity gains in diversifying firms. John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2015) and Tian and 
Wang (2015) study the effects of employee rights and unionization on takeovers in the U.S. 
We contribute to this literature by providing the first evidence on the effects of national 
employment protection regulation on the global market for corporate control and the 
importance of labor force restructuring as a motive and source of synergy gains in corporate 
takeovers.4  
																																								 																				
4 We review related literature in more detail in the following section. 
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The paper proceeds in the following way. Section II discusses related literature. Our 
data and the research design are described in Section III. We present our main empirical 
results and discuss their implications in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper 
with a summary of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
 
II. Related Literature 
The paper belongs to the literature on the effects of labor regulation on economic and 
financial performance, as well as to the voluminous M&A literature in corporate finance. 
 
II.A Labor and Financial Economics 
The evidence on stock prices overwhelmingly indicates that employment protection 
reduces firms’ market value. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Abowd (1989), and Hirsch 
(1991) document that labor union coverage has a negative association with U.S. firms 
earnings’ and market values. Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) find that the cost of 
equity is higher in more unionized industries. Lee and Mas (2012) study the impact of firm-
level union elections on firm performance and find that union wins are associated with stock 
price losses, as well as decreases in firm profitability and growth. 
There is a large literature on the relation between employment and leverage. Bronars 
and Deere (1991) use industry-level data to document a positive correlation between leverage 
and the degree of unionization as a proxy for labor bargaining power. Matsa (2010) uses 
changes in labor laws in the U.S. to identify the causal relation (if any) between labor 
bargaining power and leverage and finds a positive relationship between increases in labor 
bargaining power and firm leverage. Similarly, Lin, Schmid, and Xuan (2015) show that 
German firms subject to the employee board representation mandate have higher leverage 
than similar firms not subject to the mandate. On the other hand, using international data, 
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Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find that reforms increasing employment protection are 
associated with a significant reduction in leverage. 
Among the papers focusing on real economic variables, Botero et al. (2004) show that 
more stringent labor regulation is associated with lower labor force participation and higher 
unemployment. Besley and Burgess (2004) find that more pro-worker regulation is associated 
with lower investment and economic growth. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Mueller and 
Philippon (2011) show that family firms provide implicit employment insurance to their 
employees. Atanassov and Kim (2009) provide international evidence that strong unions 
reduce the scope for firms’ financial and economic restructuring. On the positive side, 
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2013) find that pro-labor laws can have an ex-ante 
positive effect on firms’ innovation. 
 
II.B Labor and Takeovers 
Early studies of employment effects following takeovers rely on relatively small 
samples and find little support for the idea that workforce restructuring motivates deals. For 
instance, Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) study 60 hostile takeovers taking place during 
the 1980s and find that layoffs can explain at most 10-20% of takeover premiums. Similarly, 
Kaplan (1989) studies 76 management buyouts and finds only limited evidence of 
employment declines following takeovers. Rosett (1990) shows that union wage concessions 
can hardly explain the magnitude of observed premiums in a sample of 258 takeovers. 
Evidence from plant-level studies is also mixed. On the one hand, Li (2013) studies 
productivity changes following takeovers and shows that new owners reduce wages by 0.5% 
and employment by 2.1% at the target plants. Focusing on private equity targets, Davis et al. 
(2014) find modest net job losses of 3% within 2 years and 6% within five years, relative to 
non-private-equity establishments; however there is large turnover in the form of both firing 
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and hiring. On the other hand, Ouimet and Zarutskie (2015) argue and find that acquisitions 
can also be used as a means of efficiently increasing the labor force. 
Recent studies of labor protection and takeovers include Tian and Wang (2015), John, 
Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015), and Alimov (2015). Tian and Wang (2015) focus on the 
unionization status of U.S. target firms. Exploiting close unionization ballots in a regression 
discontinuity design, they show that target firms that narrowly pass unionization ballots are 
less likely to receive takeover bids, attract lower offer premiums when they do become 
targets, and exhibit longer bid durations than firms that narrowly lose the unionization 
ballots. However, they do not find any differences in the combined firm value and 
performance, suggesting that unionization does not affect the overall efficiency gains from 
takeovers.  
John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015) focus on state-level employee protection in the 
U.S. and its effect on bidder returns. They show that bidding firms from weaker employee 
protection states, defined as states that have passed the right-to-work statutes limiting union 
power, experience 0.5% higher announcement returns. Combined firm returns are also 
increased by about 0.8%, suggesting there are higher synergy gains in deals involving bidders 
from weak employee right states. However, they further show that these effects cannot be 
explained by workforce reductions alone. They argue that stronger employee rights results in 
greater employee-shareholder agency conflicts, manifesting themselves in poorer deal 
selection and subsequent integration. Furthermore, they show that the target firm state 
employee rights do not matter. 
Finally, Alimov (2015) focuses exclusively on cross-border takeovers and shows that 
tighter employment protection in the target firm country is associated with higher levels of 





III. Data and Research Design 
III.A Sample Composition and Data Sources 
Our sample covers 21 developed countries for which we have data on major 
employment protection reforms over the 1985-2007 period. Our sample stops in 2007, 
because the global financial crisis that followed represents a severe structural shock for both 
employment protection and takeovers. In addition, because the crisis has affected the various 
economies differently – the recovery period is characterized by diverging economic 
fundamentals – the parallel trends assumption during this period is likely to be violated.5  
 The employment protection reforms data come from OECD and from Simintzi, Vig, 
and Volpin (2015), who build on the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators 
from OECD and manually identify major changes in labor market rigidity. We provide more 
background on these labor reforms in Section III.C. The M&A data come from the Thomson 
Reuters SDC M&A database. We impose the following sample selection criteria: 
1) The target is from one of the 21 developed OECD countries for which we have the 
employment protection data, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. 
2) The transaction value is at least $50 million. 
3) The acquisition represents a transfer of control, meaning that the bidder aims to bring 
its ownership in the target to more than 50%. 
The sample includes the most active takeovers markets in the world (the U.S., the U.K., 
Canada, and Japan). We supplement the M&A data with country-level economic conditions 
																																								 																				
5 Nevertheless, we have experimented with extending the sample period to 2013. The results, reported in 
Appendix B, continue to hold. 
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from the IMF and the OECD, firm-level stock return and market index data from Datastream 
(as well as CRSP for U.S. firms), and firm-level fundamental characteristics from Global 
Compustat and Worldscope. The final sample size differs across tests due to availability of 
the requisite dependent and control variables. For instance, while the country-level tests 
include public and private bidders and targets, most of our deal-level tests require that the 
target firm be public, and tests on the combined firm CARs further require that the bidding 
firm also be listed. Sample descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents a 
country-level breakdown for the number and volume of M&A deals, combined firm CARs, 
and offer premiums. We refrain from a detailed discussion of sample statistics, apart from 
noting that the most salient features are in line with prior work using international M&A data 
(see, e.g. Rossi and Volpin (2004), Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) and Lel and Miller 
(2015)). For instance, the average takeover premium is 33.8%, the average combined firm 
CAR is 2.4%, the average bidder CAR is 0.7%, consistent with the existing evidence that 
mergers generate moderate synergy gains, with targets gaining substantially from offer 
premiums and with bidders roughly breaking even. The average bid completion rate in the 
sample is 90%. All variables definitions are given in Appendix C. 
[Please Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
III.B Preliminary Evidence 
As a preliminary look at the data, in Figure 1 we plot the relation between the average 
M&A volume (scaled by GDP) for each of the 21 countries over the 1985-2007 period and 
the average EPL indicator, as published by the OECD and modified by Allard (2005), over 
the same period.6 The graph clearly displays a strong negative correlation between these two 
																																								 																				
6 We do not impose any data filters and use all takeovers from SDC in these macro country-level tests. The 
results are identical using only the deals satisfying our main sample selection criteria. 
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variables: on the one hand, M&A activity is high (at about 8% of GDP) in countries like the 
U.S. and New Zealand, where the EPL score is low (at about 1); on the other hand, M&A 
activity is low (at 4% of GDP) in countries like Italy or Spain, where EPL score is high (at 
3.3 in Italy and 3.1 in Spain). The cross-country explanatory power of employment protection 
for M&A activity is high: the R2 of this simple regression is 0.34. 
[Please Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
This correlation is consistent with our premise that workforce restructuring represents 
an important motive for corporate takeovers and a major source of synergy gains. There 
appears to be fewer takeovers in countries in which labor is highly protected. Of course, the 
simple cross-country correlation is not evidence of a causal relationship and can reflect other 
relevant differences across countries. Nevertheless, this association is consistent with our 
predictions. Moreover, it also suggests that labor market rigidity can help explain the 
substantial differences in the levels of takeover activity across countries. We now turn to a 
difference-in-differences methodology that exploits intertemporal variation in employment 
protection within countries. 
  
III.C Research Design 
To identify the causal impact of labor market rigidity on the market for corporate 
control we exploit intertemporal variation in employment protection in a difference-in-
differences research design. A canonical example of the difference-in-differences application 
in financial economics is the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) study of the effects of 
antitakeover laws on managerial behavior. 
The key identifying assumption in a difference-in-differences design is that of parallel 
trends. Specifically, identification relies on the assumption that the outcome variable would 
have behaved in similar way across treated and control groups absent treatment. In our 
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setting, this translates into maintaining that the market for corporate control would have 
evolved in a similar fashion across treated and control countries in the absence of labor 
reforms. In other words, to make causal claims, we need to ensure that employment 
protection reforms are not endogenous to takeover dynamics. This could be the case if an 
omitted variable is driving both employment protection reforms and takeover dynamics. In 
our model specifications, we will control for country-level changes that are possibly 
correlated with both. We will also explore triple difference effects in specifications that 
entirely absorb any country-year heterogeneity. Finally, we will show that the reforms are not 
systematically preceded by deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals, such as economic 
growth and development, unemployment, consumption growth, corporate profitability, stock 
market return, and sovereign yield spreads. 
Another potential endogeneity concern is that of reverse causality, whereby the link 
goes from takeovers to employment protection. However, the most plausible reverse causality 
story produces an opposite association to that we hypothesize. Specifically, if politicians 
anticipate increased takeover activity and tighten labor protection to preserve employment, 
we should observe a positive association between employment protection and takeover 
activity, whereas we predict a negative one. Further, the existing work on the political 
economy of labor regulation shows that the most important determinants of employment 
protection are legal origin and economic development (Botero et al. (2004)), electoral rules 
(Pagano and Volpin (2005), and wealth concentration (Perotti and Von Thadden (2006)). We 
will check for robustness to the inclusion of these and other political economy controls. We 
will also explore the dynamics of the effect on M&A outcomes (if any) in order to more 
closely establish the causal impact of the reforms. 
As our major shocks to employment protection, we utilize 21 labor market reforms 
identified by Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015). These reforms track changes to the national 
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rules and regulations governing regular and fixed-term employment contracts, as well as 
collective dismissals. This includes procedural requirements on firing, standards for “unfair 
dismissals”, conditions on the use of temporary contracts,7 notice periods and severance pay 
requirements, delays and costs associated with collective dismissals. The reader can refer to 
Appendix B of their paper for the detailed description of each of the reforms in each of the 
countries. Use of the discrete reform index as opposed to the continuous index such as that 
proposed by Allard (2005) is justified on two grounds: i) econometric (maximizing the 
signal-to-noise ratio), and ii) expositional (easing the interpretation of economic magnitudes). 
The correlation between our reform index and the Allard (2005) EPL index (in changes) is 
0.51, and we will show that our results are robust to the use of this alternative index. 
Of these reforms, nine have tightened employment protection: Austria (1988), Belgium 
(1998), France (1990, 1993), Greece (1988), Italy (1991), Portugal (1989), Switzerland 
(1994), and the U.S. (1989). The other twelve reforms have reduced employment protection: 
Australia (2005), Austria (2003), Denmark (1990), Germany (1997), Italy (1998), 
Netherlands (1988, 1999), Norway (1994), Portugal (1991), Spain (1994), and Sweden (1993, 
1997).  
Note that not every country in our sample has experienced a major employment 
protection reform during the sample period: Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, 
and the U.K. did not have any such reform. As a consequence, these countries will always be 
in the control group. On the contrary, some of the sample countries have experienced two 
major reforms (namely, Austria, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden). The 
staggered nature of the reforms allows the same country to be in both treated and control 
groups at different points in time, further alleviating the concerns that the results could be 
picking up unobservable differences across countries.  
																																								 																				
7	We will show that our results are unchanged when we exclude reforms affecting only temporary workers. 
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Our treatment indicator 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! (where k indexes countries and t indexes years) is set to 
zero for all countries as of 1985 (𝐸𝑃𝐿!,!"#$ = 0). In each of the subsequent years, the prior 
year’s value remains constant if there were no major employment protection reforms in that 
country in that year (𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! = 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,!!!). It increases by one if there is a major reform 
increasing employment protection in that country and year (𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! = 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,!!! + 1). Finally, 
it decreases by one if there is a major reform decreasing employment protection in that 
country and year (𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! = 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,!!! – 1). By construction, this index treats all employment 
protection reforms equally. It is designed to capture large, long-run changes in employment 
protection regulation over time, and is not comparable across countries. 
A primary concern in difference-in-differences analyses is the possibility that another 
omitted factor that is relevant for the outcome variable of interest changes 
contemporaneously with the treatment indicator. Note that this concern is somewhat 
alleviated in our setting given that our identification strategy relies on 21 different shocks to 
labor market rigidity. That is, one would have to find an unobserved contemporaneous 
change that systematically accompanies labor market reforms across different countries and 
over time. In an attempt to alleviate these concerns even further, we examine the dynamics of 
various macroeconomic factors in the two years preceding the reforms. Specifically, we 
regress country-level GDP growth, GDP per capita, unemployment, consumption growth, 
average profitability (return on assets) of the corporate sector, stock market index, and 
sovereign yield spreads on an indicator EPL(-n) which takes the value of 1(-1) if a country will 
tighten (loosen) employment protection in n years. If the reforms are systematically passed in 
response to certain economic conditions, the coefficient on EPL-n will be statistically 
different from zero. We use both n=2 and n=1 to capture any long-run effects. The results of 
this analysis, reported in Appendix A, indicate that none of these macroeconomic variables 
	16 
	
exhibit any systematic patterns in the run-up to employment protection reforms. With such 
reassurance in mind, we proceed to our main analysis.   
For the country-level tests (deal numbers and volumes), we perform least squares 
regressions of the following specification: 
𝑦!"# = 𝛽 ×𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! + 𝜃×𝑋!" +  𝛾!×𝛼! +  𝛾!×𝛿! + 𝜀!"#,        (1) 
where 𝑦!"# is the number (value) of deals in an industry j in a country k in the year t, 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! 
is a reform indicator for target firm country k in the year t as defined above, 𝑋!" is a vector of 
country-level controls, 𝛾!×𝛼! is an industry-country fixed effect, 𝛾!×𝛿! is an industry-year 
fixed effect, and 𝜀!"# is the error term. We aggregate the deal numbers and volumes at the 
country-industry-year level, and the regressions are weighted by the average number of listed 
firms in the pre-treatment period. As the effect of the reform is more precisely estimated in 
countries with larger takeover markets, the weighting ensures that we give more weight to the 
more accurate estimations. In addition, this maintains consistency with the deal-level tests 
described below, where more weight is naturally put on the more active takeover markets 
with a greater number of deals entering the estimation. 
For the deal-level tests (combined CAR, offer premium, bidder and target CAR), we 
run the following regression specification estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS): 
𝑦!" = 𝛽 ×𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! +  𝜃×𝑋!" +  𝛾!×𝛼! +  𝛾!×𝛿! + 𝜀!",        (2) 
where 𝑦!" is a deal-level outcome for deal i in country k in the year t, 𝐸𝑃𝐿!,! is a reform 
indicator for target firm country k in the year t as defined above, 𝑋!" is a vector of deal-level 
controls, 𝛾!×𝛼! is an industry-country fixed effect, 𝛾!×𝛿! is an industry-year fixed effect, and 𝜀!" is the error term. That is, we make within-industry comparisons of the change in deal-
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level outcomes in countries passing an employment protection reform (treatment group) and 
the same change in countries not passing a reform (control group). 
In all cases, statistical inferences are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors double-clustered by the two dimensions of the panel (country and year in deal-level 
tests; industry-country and industry-year in the country-level tests since we are collapsing the 
data at these levels).8 
 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
IV.A Country-Level Tests 
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of employment protection reforms on 
the overall activity of the takeover market. To that effect, we examine deal numbers and deal 
volumes in countries passing employment protection reforms and compare them to deal 
numbers and volumes in countries that had no changes to employment protection in that year. 
We aggregate deal numbers and volumes at the industry level. These country-level tests allow 
us to include both public and private bidders and targets. We use the thirteen SDC macro 
industries: keeping the categories broad enough avoids having zero or near zero values for 
certain industries in countries with relatively less active takeover markets, which would make 
the impact of the reforms (if any) look larger. We estimate the country-level tests using 
weighted regressions, where the importance weights  are the average number of listed firms 
in that country measured over the 1985-1987 period – i.e., before the first reform in our 
sample.9 The results are reported in Table 3. 
																																								 																				
8 We have experimented with alternative clustering levels. Double clustering by country and year used in the 
reported results produces the most conservative standard errors.  
9 We fix the value at the average of the pre-treatment period to avoid the weight being potentially affected by 
the reform. The results are identical if we allow the weights to update. 
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Column (1) of Table 3 estimates the baseline effect on deal volumes controlling for 
time-varying country-level economic conditions, namely GDP per capita, GDP growth, and a 
set of dummies for the level of creditor rights protection. We estimate that the average effect 
of labor reforms is -0.27, significant at the 1% level, suggesting that deal volumes drop by 
27% in countries that tighten employment protection relative to deal volumes in the same 
industry in non-reforming countries. Column (2) examines the dynamics of the effect. There 
is no statistically significant effect in the years prior to the reforms, and there is a permanent 
decline in every year subsequent to the reforms. Finally, Column (3) examines separately 
positive and negative changes to employment protection. We find that each of them moves 
the outcome variable in the predicted direction: tighter labor protection has a negative impact, 
while lighter labor protection has a positive impact on M&A volumes.  
Note however that the results based on deal volumes will somewhat overstate the true 
effect if there is also an impact on the pricing of the deals – that is, if offer premiums, which 
are included in deal values, are also reduced because of the reforms. We will examine this 
question in Section IV.C. An alternative way to circumvent this issue is to examine deal 
numbers. Columns (4), (5), and (6) therefore repeat the tests with deal numbers as the 
dependent variable. The average effect estimated in Column (4) is -0.14, again significant at 
the 1% level. The dynamics analysis reported in Column (5) confirms that there is no effect 
prior to the passage of the reforms and that there is a permanent decline in deal numbers in all 
the years following the reforms. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that deal volumes 
drop by about 14% in response to tighter employment protection. Column (6) reveals that the 
effect is large and significant for increases in employment protection, but not so for 
decreases: it is possible that labor restructuring is a more important consideration in large 
deals, so that deal volumes respond to reductions in employment protection while deal 
numbers do not.  
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[Please Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
IV.B. Deal-Level Tests: Combined CAR 
We now examine the effect of employment protection on the expected takeover 
synergies. If stock market participants correctly anticipate the costs and benefits of the 
merger, the change in the market value of the combined firm (combined firm CAR) provides 
an estimate of the synergy gains brought about by the combination (see, e.g. Bradley, Desai, 
and Kim (1988), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Devos, Kadapakkam, and 
Krishnamurthy (2009)). Hence, these tests are based on a sample of deals where both the 
bidder and the target are listed. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the combined firm 
CAR analysis. 
Column (1) shows that the average baseline effect is -1.99 percentage points, 
significant at the 1% level. Column (2) explores the dynamics of the effect and shows once 
again that there is no impact of the reforms on the combined firm gains prior to their passage, 
while there is a persistent decline in the years following the change. Both increases and 
decreases in employment protection move the takeover synergy in the predicted direction as 
shown in Column (3). Finally, in Column (4) we add target, bidder, and deal-level controls 
(namely the size of the target, whether it employs any defensive tactics, whether the bidder 
has a toehold, whether the deals is in same industry, cross-border, paid for with cash, hostile, 
and includes competing bidders). We find that the magnitude of the effect is unchanged and 
is still significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate of -2.06 suggests that tighter 
employment protection reduces synergy gains by 83% of its unconditional average of 2.4%, 
and by 52% relative to the average combined firm CAR of 4.0% in the pre-treatment period 
for the group of countries experiencing. To put a dollar value on this estimate, a 2.06 
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percentage points reduction in combined firm value is equivalent to a loss of $235 million 
($45.4 million) in shareholder value for a mean(median)-sized bidder-target combination.  
Note however that, insofar as the reforms do not completely shut down the ability to 
restructure the labor force but only make it costlier, this result is a lower-bound estimate on 
the importance of labor restructuring as a source of efficiency gains in takeovers. At the same 
time, if the costs associated with more onerous labor regulation prevent combinations of 
firms that would have created value through channels other than those related to workforce 
optimization (e.g., resource complementarities, technological innovation, cross-selling 
opportunities) then the above is an overestimate of the importance of employee restructuring 
as a source of takeover gains.  
[Please Insert Table 4 about Here] 
 
VI.C. Deal-Level Tests: Cross-Sectional Effects 
Even though we have shown that employment protection reforms are not passed in 
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions, a potential concern with our analysis so 
far is that some other omitted variable (for instance, a contemporaneous reform in areas other 
than employment protection) may be behind both the change in deal activity levels, the 
combined CAR, and employment protection. To address this concern we explore cross-
sectional, or, heterogeneous, treatment effects. If the results we document are attributable to 
the labor channel, we should expect to observe stronger effects on deals with greater potential 
for workforce restructuring. To that effect, we employ four proxies for the potential for 
workforce optimization.  
First, we construct a business overlap indicator, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the bidder and the target belong to the same country and same industry, 
and zero otherwise. Changes in employment protection should have a greater effect when 
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bidder and target have a high degree of business overlap since these deals are more likely to 
be motivated by cost-cutting objectives. Second, we proxy for the target’s abnormal labor 
productivity as the difference between its sales-per-employee ratio and industry average. This 
measure captures (inversely) the potential for labor efficiency improvements at the deal level 
and we therefore expect a greater impact of the reforms on deals with greater such potential. 
Third, we estimate the importance or workforce reduction at the industry-level as the sample 
average workforce reduction one-year after the merger. We expect a greater decline in deal 
activity levels and takeover synergies for industries with generally higher levels of post-
merger employee turnover (note that this measure uses ex-post information, so should be 
interpreted with caution). Finally, we employ industry maturity measured by sales growth as 
an (inverse) proxy for consolidation needs. Higher values of this variable imply higher 
growth potential and, thus, less need for consolidation.  
Table 5 reports the results of these tests for deal activity levels. We regress our proxies 
for deals motivated by labor restructuring on the EPL indicator, a set of fixed effects, and 
bidder, target, and deal level controls using linear probability models. Column (1) uses 
Business Overlap dummy as our first proxy. The coefficient on the EPL indicator is negative 
and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that there are fewer deals with business overlap 
following the reforms tightening employment protection. This is consistent with our premise 
that deals following such reforms are less motivated by the desire to eliminate overlapping 
operations. Column (2) uses a high productivity dummy as the dependent variable, which 
takes the value of one if the deal falls in the top tercile of the target abnormal productivity 
distribution. The coefficient on the EPL indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level, suggesting that targets following the reforms tightening employment protection are 
more likely to have higher labor efficiency – consistent with these deals being less motivated 
by labor efficiency improvements. Column (3) uses a High Restructuring dummy, which 
	22 
	
takes the value of one if the deal takes place in an SIC4 industry from the top tercile of the 
post-merger workforce restructuring distribution. The coefficient on the EPL indicator is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that deals taking place after reforms that 
tightenen employment protection come from industries where post-merger workforce 
restructuring is typically low. This is again consistent with labor restructuring becoming a 
less important M&A driver following such reforms. Finally, column (4) uses a High Growth 
dummy, which takes the value of one if the target’s industry (SIC4) is in the top tercile of 
past sales growth. The coefficient on the EPL indicator is positive and significant at the 10% 
level, suggesting that deals following reforms tightening employment protection are more 
likely to occur in growing industries, which is consistent with lesser need for consolidation. 
Overall, the results of these tests indicate that the types of deals observed following reforms 
that tighten employment protection are those in which labor restructuring is less likely to be 
an important motivation. 
[Please Insert Table 5 about Here] 
Table 6 presents similar tests for combined firm CAR using a triple-difference 
specification. In Column (1), we augment the specification estimated in Table 4 with the 
Business Overlap indicator interacted with EPL, as well as with country and year fixed 
effects and all the control variables (to ensure a correct triple difference interpretation).10 In 
Column (2) we further add country-year fixed effects, such that the EPL indicator itself is 
absorbed and only the interaction effects between the labor reform indicator and our proxies 
for workforce optimization potential are identified. The coefficient estimate shows a more 
negative effect of employment protection reforms on combined CAR for deals with greater 
potential for workforce synergies. 
																																								 																				
10 The main effect of the conditioning variable is omitted when fully interacted with industry-year and industry-
country fixed effects. 
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Columns (3) and (4) repeat these tests using the target’s abnormal labor productivity 
(High Productivity dummy) interaction. The coefficient on this interaction term is positive, 
consistent with the prediction that the reduction in combined firm gains as a result of EPL 
reforms should be smaller for deals in which the potential for labor productivity 
improvements at the target is limited. 
Columns (5) and (6) use post-merger workforce reduction at the industry level as our 
measure of the importance of labor restructuring. The coefficient on the EPL X High 
Restructuring interaction term is negative, suggesting that there is a stronger negative effect 
of labor reforms on the combined CAR in industries that exhibit higher levels of post-merger 
employee turnover. Finally, Columns (7) and (8) use target firm industry growth as a proxy 
for the need for consolidation. The coefficient on the EPL X High Growth interaction terms is 
positive, suggesting that the effect of employment protection is significantly less negative 
when the target industry is characterized by greater growth opportunities. 
Overall, there is strong evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects that is consistent 
with the labor force channel being the driver of the established link between labor regulation 
and takeover gains. While it is still possible that EPL reforms are correlated with changes in 
other variables that are relevant for takeover gains, any such omitted variable would have to 
generate similarly heterogeneous effects on takeover activity and gains across the four cross-
sectional dimensions we explored here.11   
[Please Insert Table 6 about Here] 
 
IV.D. Deal-Level Tests: Division of Gains 
																																								 																				
11 Moreover, note that the inclusion of country-year fixed effects does not change the coefficient estimates on 
the interaction effects, suggesting that no major omitted variable at the country-year level biases their 
estimation. This further validates the assumptions underlying our difference-in-differences approach.  
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So far we have established that takeover activity declines following reforms that make 
workforce restructuring more difficult, as the synergy gains from business combinations 
motivated by labor optimization are reduced. If bidders and targets change their offer and 
acceptance decisions when faced with this shock to the availability of takeover gains, 
employment protection reforms may affect not only the level but also the division of takeover 
gains between target and acquirer shareholders. We explore this possibility in this section. To 
that effect, we break down the combined firm CAR into its components, namely, the bidder 
CAR and the target CAR, and also examine the offer premium. Examining these variables 
also allows us to incorporate more observations into the analysis, as it does not require both 
parties to be listed. 
If bidders make full adjustment to the offer price (premium), we should see no effect of 
employment protection reforms on bidder returns. However, if bidders do not fully adjust 
their offers for the scarcer workforce optimization opportunities, then we should see a 
negative impact of employment protection reforms on bidder returns. Target CARs are 
expected to follow the results on offer premiums. Table 7 presents the results of these tests.  
Columns (1) through (4) use offer premium and target firm CAR as the dependent 
variables. These tests are based on a subsample of listed targets, but the bidder can be either a 
private or a public firm.  The specifications are otherwise identical to those in Table 4. 
Column (1) reports the baseline estimate of the effect of labor reforms on premiums (in 
percentage points). The coefficient is -10.95, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that, 
following the reforms, takeover premiums decline by about 11 percentage points relative to 
countries that have not experienced a reform in that year. Column (2) incorporates target, 
bidder, and deal-level controls, namely the size of the target, whether it employs any 
defensive tactics, whether the bidder has a toehold, whether the bidder is a listed firm, 
whether the deals is same industry, cross-border, paid for with cash, is hostile, and includes 
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competing bidders. The inclusion of these controls leaves the magnitude of the coefficient 
virtually unchanged, at -11.24, and still statistically significant at the 1% level. An 11-
percentage points reduction in takeover premiums corresponds to about a third of the 
unconditional premium of 33.8%. Columns (3) and (4) use target firm CAR as the dependent 
variable. As expected, the results mirror those for offer premiums, namely that the target firm 
gains decline by about 4 percentage points in response to regulation making labor 
restructuring costlier.12  
Recall that we estimate the effect of EPL reforms on synergy gains to be in the range of 
50-80% of the unconditional mean of the combined firm CAR. Coupled with the above 
results showing that offer premiums are adjusted by about a third, this suggests that bidders 
are not able to adjust their offers one-for-one with the reduction in synergy gains. We should 
therefore expect to find that bidders are experiencing lower returns following reforms. 
Columns (5) and (6) test this prediction using the bidding firm CAR as the dependent 
variable. The estimates indicate that bidder returns, indeed, decline in response to 
employment protection increases by about 0.45 percentage points, or by about 1.16 
percentage points when all deal-level control variables are included (which, in this case, also 
amounts to focusing on the subset of listed targets). These results suggest that, on average, 
bidders do not fully adjust offer prices in response to labor reforms that make workforce 
restructuring costlier. The reduction in synergies is shared by both bidder and target 
shareholders. 
[Please Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
																																								 																				
12 The magnitude of the effect on target CARs is somewhat smaller than that on the offer premium. This can be 
due to several reasons. First, the CAR incorporates market expectation about completion probability. Second, 
offer premiums are measured relative to an undisturbed share price four weeks prior to the announcement, 
whereas the target CAR misses any run-up prior to the immediate window around the announcement day.  
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IV.E. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we comment on a number of further robustness tests that, for the sake of 
exposition, are reported in Appendix B. First, we extend the sample period to include the 
post-crisis (post-2008) period.13 Second, as the U.S. represents a large portion of the sample 
and is also the most active takeover market, we re-estimate our results excluding the U.S. 
Third, we switch our measure of employment protection to the original OECD EPL index as 
modified by Allard (2005) that used in Figure 1; this index does not focus only on the large 
reforms but is comparable across countries. Fourth, we incorporate additional country-level 
political economy controls, namely income inequality (Gini coefficient), left/right 
governments, union density, voting rules (proportionality), and the corporate tax rate. Fifth, 
we exclude countries that have not experienced any labor reforms throughout the sample 
period. Sixth, we exclude the reforms affecting only temporary workers (8 out of 21 reforms). 
In all cases, we find that our main results, namely a negative effect of stronger employment 
protection on M&A activity, synergy gains, and premiums continue to hold, with some minor 
changes to significance levels  
Finally, we also perform two “placebo” tests. In the first placebo test, we assign 
placebo EPL reforms when a neighboring country experiences an EPL reform. If the effects 
we document are indeed driven by EPL reforms and not by general economic conditions 
affecting the region, we should not find significant responses to these placebo reforms. In the 
second placebo test, we assign placebo EPL reforms based on a predictive model using the 
political economy and macroeconomic characteristics. Specifically, we regress, at the 
country-year level, changes in EPL (separately for positive and negative reforms) on lagged 
GDP growth, GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, union density, voting proportionality index, 
corporate tax rate, and dummies for left and right governments. We then obtain fitted values 
																																								 																				
13 The three additional reforms during this period are increases in employment protection in Greece (2007), 
Ireland (2007) and Japan (2011).		
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from this regression, and assign 2% of highest predicted values as placebo reforms – this 
corresponds to the number of country-year observations with EPL reforms. If the effects we 
document are, indeed, due to EPL reforms and not the underlying macroeconomic or political 
economy conditions in the country, we should find no response to these placebo reforms 
obeying the key patterns of the real reforms in the data. For both types of placebo tests, we 
find no significant effect on deal volumes, numbers, or combined firm returns. 
Another issue that potentially affects the estimated magnitude of the effect is that the 
composition of deals may change following the reforms. Our results on deal activity show 
that certain deals disappear from the market. This may imply that the types of deals observed 
before and after the reforms are not necessarily the same. If this is the case, such composition 
effects may bias our estimates of the true effect of the reforms on takeover gains. In order to 
address the above concern, ideally, one should compare the same deal before and after the 
reforms; however, this is clearly impossible. Alternatively, one can attempt to control for as 
much of deal heterogeneity as possible.  
To the extent that takeover gains are industry-specific, within-industry comparison 
helps alleviate concerns regarding deal composition. Note that our tests already include 
industry-year and industry-country fixed effects. By comparing the outcomes of deals within 
the same industry, we somewhat mitigate the concern that what we are capturing is a re-
composition effect. Throughout our paper we have kept our industry definitions relatively 
broad (the 13 industries classification provided by SDC) in order to ensure sufficient number 
of deals per industry in the country-level tests. However, for the deal-level tests we can 
introduce more granularity into our industry definitions. We have experimented with using 
814 SIC4 industries and further saturating the combined firm CAR regression specifications 
with 1,558 SIC4-year and SIC4-country dummies. Here, the point estimate of the effect of 
EPL reforms is -2.9. Relative to the average combined firm CAR in the pre-treatment period 
	28 
	
of 4.0%, the results suggest that workforce restructuring represents about 73% of the typical 
synergy gain. Note, however, that this precision comes at the cost of losing roughly 30% of 
the sample due to single observations for certain SIC4-year or SIC4-country combinations 
being absorbed by the fixed effects. 
Perhaps an even more conservative way to control for deal heterogeneity before and 
after the reform is to examine the effects of the reform on deals involving the same target 
company. This test is made possible by the presence of withdrawn bids in our sample, with 
those target firms being targeted again after the EPL reforms are enacted. To the extent that 
synergy gains are target-specific, such a comparison again helps alleviate deal composition 
concerns. In our sample, there are 1,142 deals involving 537 distinct target firms being 
targeted both before and after the EPL reforms. Here, we find that the combined firm CAR is 
reduced by 4.0% in response to the reforms. Relative to the average combined firm CAR in 
the pre-treatment period of 5.1% in this subsample, one can argue that roughly 78% of the 
gains priced by the market at the time of the first bid announcement (before the EPL reform 
is passed) come from workforce restructuring. Again, note that the sample size in this test is 
very low. Overall, these tests suggest that further controls for deal types do not significantly 
alter (and even slightly increase) our estimates of the importance of workforce restructuring 
for takeover gains. 
 
IV.F. The Labor Channel 
Finally, a natural extension of our analysis is to examine the effect of labor reforms on 
post-merger layoffs themselves, with the prediction being that tighter employment protection 
is, indeed, associated with lower levels of post-merger workforce restructuring. Note however 
that this analysis is complicated by several data limitations. First, firm-level employment data 
is only available for a fraction of our sample. Second, any changes in employee headcount 
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reflect both firing and hiring, while we expect the mechanism for the effects we document to 
work largely through the former. And third, we can only observe changes in employment at 
the combined firm relative to the bidder and the target before the deal, whereas we expect 
most of the layoffs to occur at the target firm, and the latter typically represents a smaller part 
of the combined firm.  
With these caveats in mind, we proceed to examining the effect of mergers on 
employment, and then evaluate the effect of EPL reforms on this association. These tests are 
performed at the deal-year level, whereby we expand our initial dataset of deals by adding the 
information on the number of employees at the bidder and the target prior to the deal, as well 
as at the combined entity following the merger. We perform this procedure on completed 
deals only and restrict our analysis to a five-year window around the year of deal completion. 
With this deal-year panel at hand, we estimate the change in the (log) number of 
employees at the combined firm after the merger relative to the combined number of 
employees in the bidder and the target prior to the deal (denoted “Post Merger”)14. Inclusion 
of industry-year fixed effects in this specification turns the coefficient on the Post Merger 
indicator into an estimate of the abnormal change in employment following takeovers, with 
the benchmark being the change in employment at our sample firms in the same industry that 
have not merged in that year. We then test whether this effect is different across reforming 
and non-reforming country-years by interacting the Post Merger indicator with the EPL 
indicator and including EPL-industry-year and EPL-industry-country fixed effects; the latter 
ensures that we are not capturing the effect of the reforms on employment (if any) that is 
independent of mergers. Finally, we verify that the effect of EPL reforms on post-merger 
restructuring does not arise because the laws are passed at a time when post-merger 
restructuring becomes more difficult across countries, or because the reforms are passed in 
																																								 																				
14 This is achieved by the inclusion of deal fixed effects, such that we always compare post-merger employment 
to the pre-merger employment at the same pair of firms.  
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countries where the magnitude of post-merger restructuring is always low. This is achieved 
by augmenting the previous specification with Post Merger-industry-year and Post Merger-
industry-country fixed effects. As with all tests, we cluster standard errors at the two 
dimensions of the panel, which in this cases amounts to double clustering by deal and by 
year. Table 8 reports the estimation results.  
Column (1) shows the baseline estimate of the effect of takeovers on employment (Post 
Merger), with the coefficient indicating that, on average, following takeovers, employment at 
the combined firm is reduced by about 6% relative to the employment at the bidder and the 
target prior to the deal. Interestingly, this estimate matches the 6% reduction in employment 
at U.S. establishments acquired by private equity as found by Davis et al. (2014). Column (2) 
estimates the effect of EPL reforms on this association (EPL x Post Merger) and shows that, 
following the reforms, the reduction in employment following takeovers is moderated by 
about 5%, relative to an unconditional reduction in employment of about 9%.15  
We also explore the dynamics of the effect of employment protection reforms on 
workforce restructuring in the post-merger years (Column (3)). We find that there is 
significant reduction in the combined firm employment in all years following the merger, and 
that there is an offsetting effect in all of those years when a country passes an EPL reform.  
Finally, in Column (4) we estimate the difference-in-differences effect of EPL reforms 
on post-merger workforce restructuring and we find that EPL reforms are associated with 
preservation of roughly 7% of the combined firm workforce.16 Overall, these results further 
cement the labor force channel interpretation for the effects on deal outcomes that we 
documented above. 
																																								 																				
15 Note that the main effect of labor reforms (EPL) on employment at the combined firm is absorbed when fully 
interacted with industry-year and industry-country fixed effects. 
16 Once again, the main effect of takeovers (Post Merger) on employment at the combined firm is omitted when 
fully interacted with industry-year and industry-country fixed effects. 
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[Please Insert Table 8 about Here] 
The results of our analysis indicate that the ease with which the bidder can restructure 
the workforce of the target accounts for between 50 and 80% of the typical takeover gain in 
takeovers of listed firms.17 However, it is important to note that, to the extent that burdens on 
workforce restructuring prevent other types of restructuring from happening (e.g., downsizing 
or closing down plants may not take place when the associated workers cannot be laid off), it 
may not be appropriate to attribute the entire magnitude of the effect to cost savings from 
laying off workforce. Rather, this estimate should be interpreted as the importance of the 
bidder’s ability to implement operational efficiency improvements that directly or indirectly 
involve workforce restructuring. 
In order to triangulate these results, we perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of 
whether the estimated magnitude of the change in synergy gains matches the expected cost 
savings associated with workforce optimization. Recall that our estimate of the effect of EPL 
reforms on post-merger workforce restructuring is 7%, i.e. reforms tightening employment 
protection are associated with a preservation of 7% of the combined firm workforce. An 
average bidder-target combination in this sub-sample has 31,446 employees, such that a 7% 
figure corresponds to 2,201 workers. For consistency, we re-estimate the effect of EPL 
reforms on the combined firm CAR in the same sub-sample and find that the synergy gains 
are reduced by 1.8%. An average bidder-target combination in this sub-sample has a market 
capitalization of $15.2 billion, so 1.8% corresponds to $274.1 million reduction in synergies. 
Since the stock market is reflecting after-tax gains and we wish to compare them with pre-tax 
																																								 																				
17 A caveat is in order. Given our use of event study methodology, this estimate of the importance of workforce 
restructuring applies to expected takeover gains. That is, if the market puts higher weight on the arguably more 
realistic cost synergies than on the more speculative revenue synergies (e.g., cross-selling etc.), then our 
estimate of the importance of workforce restructuring for takeover synergies may be too high. A more precise 
interpretation of our estimates is then that workforce restructuring represents 50-80% of the expected takeover 
gains priced by the market. 
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wages, we gross up the $274.1 million figure by the average tax rate in our sample countries 
over the sample period of 39%, resulting in a pre-tax change in synergy gains of $449.3 
million. Treating this figure as the present value of an annuity of wage savings, we can infer 
what the wages should be to justify the synergy. For this calculation, we assume that i) absent 
the merger, the firms involved would have continued paying the 2,201 workers for a period 
equal to average worker tenure in OECD countries of 9.52 years18 and ii) the wage savings 
are capitalized at a discount rate equal to the average equity market return in our sample 
countries over the sample period of 8.7%. The annual wage saving coming out of this 
calculation is $71.3 million, or $32,395 per employee. These are the wage savings figures 
that would reconcile the observed changes in synergy gains and changes in employment 
following the reforms. These figures appear to be in the right ballpark, as the weighted-
average worker wage (weighted by the number of deals to avoid the U.S. overstating the 
average wage) in our sample countries over the period 1990-2007 (the earliest we could 
obtain data for) is $37,344. Therefore, the estimated magnitude of the effect of employment 
protection reforms on synergy gains squares well with the estimated cost savings associated 
with employment effects of the same reforms. This admittedly ad-hoc analysis nevertheless 
helps further alleviate omitted variables concerns that our results are reflecting some other 
contemporaneous changes.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have set out to establish the importance of labor restructuring as a 
motive and as a source of synergy gains in corporate takeovers. Using cross-country and 
time-series variation in the degree of employment protection afforded by national laws and 
regulations, we have shown that employment protection has a profound effect on the market 
																																								 																				
18 We approximate the average worker tenure with the inverse of gross annual job losses of 10.5% (Source: 
OECD Employment Outlook 1996, Chapter 5, Table 5.1).  
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for corporate control. Passage of major labor regulation reforms that increase employment 
protection is associated with a marked decline in the number and volume of mergers and 
acquisitions. These reforms also reduce total synergy gains by 50-80%. These results are 
consistent with workforce restructuring being a significant source of cost synergies. To 
buttress this interpretation we show that i) the reforms are indeed associated with the extent 
of post-merger employment changes whose magnitude matches the magnitude of the changes 
in synergies, and ii) within country-years subject to the reforms, the decline in takeover 
numbers, volumes, and synergy gains is stronger for deals with greater potential for 
workforce reduction On average, bidders do not fully adjust offer prices for the changes in 
synergies and both bidders and targets experience a decline in their announcement returns. 
Overall, our findings suggest that restructuring activities directly or indirectly involving 
labor are a major driver of the market for corporate control and a key source of merger 
synergies. Labor market rigidity could explain much of the differences in activity of the 
takeover market around the world. Our results also suggest that mergers and acquisitions is 
an important channel through which employment protection regulation affects productivity 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The sample includes 
45,696 M&A deals from SDC over the 1985-2007 period. To be included in the sample, the target 
company must be located in one the 21 OECD countries considered in our study, the deal value must 
be higher than $50M, and the stake sought by the bidding firm must be greater than 50%. All 




Count Mean Stdv p10 p50 p90
Deal-level Variables
Bidder Market Value (in million $) 24,724 8,479 29,434 142 1,372 16,276
Business Overlap 45,696 22.3% 41.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
CAR Bidder [-3,+3] 23,806 0.7% 8.2% -8.3% 0.1% 10.3%
CAR Combined [-3,+3] 7,129 2.4% 7.7% -6.2% 1.5% 12.3%
CAR Target [-3,+3] 11,949 20.6 22.4 -2.0 16.9 49.4
Completed 45,696 90.8% 28.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Cross Border 45,696 24.5% 43.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Deal Value (in milion $) 45,696 647.5 3,048.3 60.3 157.0 1,073.3
Defense 45,696 3.6% 18.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Hostile 45,696 3.5% 18.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Multiple Bidders 45,696 5.3% 22.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Offer Premium 9,906 33.8% 30.0% 2.8% 28.6% 72.2%
Public Bidder 45,696 57.5% 49.4% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Public Target 45,696 29.6% 45.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Same Industry 45,696 41.2% 49.2% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Stock Payment 30,569 17.0% 37.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Target Abnormal Productivity (in thous. $) 12,800 -97 508 -397 -40 188
Target Market Value (in million $) 12,591 1,133 4,169 45 196 2,158
Target Market Value (log) 12,591 5.5 1.5 3.8 5.3 7.7
Toehold 45,696 1.5% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Industry-level Variables
Post Merger Workforce Change 559 15.8% 37.3% -15.2% 8.1% 51.7%
Growth 5,626 15.7% 23.8% -2.6% 10.8% 37.2%
Country-level Variables
Corporate Tax Rate 460 37.0% 8.7% 28.0% 35.0% 50.0%
Creditors Rights 460 2.1 1.1 1.0 2.0 3.0
GDP Growth 460 2.7% 1.7% 0.5% 2.8% 5.0%
GDP per Capita (in thous. $) 460 25.8 11.2 12.6 24.4 39.7
Gini 460 31.6 4.6 26.0 31.4 37.0
Left Government 460 40.9% 49.2% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Proportionality 460 1.7 1.2 0.0 2.0 3.0
Right Government 460 46.3% 49.9% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%




M&A Activity by Country 
 
The table reports statistics on M&A activity and combined firm CAR by country. The sample 
includes 45,696 M&A deals from SDC over the 1985-2007 period. To be included in the sample, the 
target company must be located in one the 21 OECD countries considered in our study, the deal value 
must be higher than $50M, and the stake sought by the bidding firm must be greater than 50%. All 










Australia 1,897 768 405 278 3.9% 3.6%
Austria 126 61 481 9 2.6% 2.4%
Belgium 261 172 658 23 3.2% 0.5%
Canada 2,492 1,247 501 471 1.7% 1.1%
Denmark 284 125 439 25 4.6% 1.3%
Finland 287 103 360 16 6.0% 4.1%
France 1,583 1,112 703 123 1.4% 0.9%
Germany 1,410 1,122 796 71 1.3% 0.3%
Greece 84 46 546 27 2.4% 0.6%
Ireland-Rep 196 75 383 12 2.3% 1.7%
Italy 1,095 882 806 24 -0.2% -0.4%
Japan 1,066 781 733 227 1.7% 1.1%
Netherlands 730 746 1,023 60 3.8% 2.0%
New Zealand 269 86 320 16 6.3% 5.6%
Norway 414 196 474 77 3.3% 2.9%
Portugal 161 106 659 13 4.2% 1.8%
Spain 801 492 614 45 3.2% 1.7%
Sweden 834 414 496 77 4.3% 3.5%
Switzerland 344 388 1,128 39 3.4% 2.1%
United Kingdom 6,074 3,813 628 707 3.7% 2.8%
United States 25,288 16,855 667 4,789 2.2% 1.2%




Industry-Level M&A Activity and EPL Reforms 
 
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of EPL reforms on the volume 
(Columns 1 to 3) and the number (Columns 4 to 6) of M&A deals at the industry level. Industries are 
the 13 macro industries defined by SDC. EPL is a reform indicator that is set to zero in 1985 and then 
increments by 1 (-1) each time the target firm country tightens (loosens) employment protection. EPL 
y-(+)i is a dummy equal to one if the year of the deal is the ith year before (after) the reform, and zero 
otherwise (y++ denotes year +4 and beyond). Country control variables include GDP per Capita, GDP 
Growth, and Creditor Rights Index dummies. Industry-year fixed effects are based on the 13 macro 
industries defined by SDC. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Regressions are weighted by the 
number of listed firms in the country over the pre-treatment period. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by industry-country and industry-year (t-statistics in 







Dependent Variable: M&A Activity by Industry
Measure of M&A activity Deal Volume in M$ (log) Deal Number (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL -0.27*** -0.14***
(-3.33) (-3.73)
EPL y-2 0.01 -0.05
(0.06) (-0.64)
EPL y-1 0.06 0.04
(0.34) (0.49)
EPL y+0 -0.17 -0.03
(-1.35) (-0.48)
EPL y+1 -0.43*** -0.26***
(-2.93) (-3.26)
EPL y+2 -0.45*** -0.25***
(-3.19) (-3.59)
EPL y+3 -0.37** -0.24***
(-2.38) (-3.47)






Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Combined CAR and EPL Reforms 
 
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of EPL reforms on the combined 
firm CAR [-3;+3] expressed in percentage points. EPL is a reform indicator that is set to zero in 1985 
and then increments by 1 (-1) each time the target firm country tightens (loosens) employment 
protection. EPL y-(+)i is a dummy equal to one if the year of the deal is the ith year before (after) the 
reform, and zero otherwise (y++ denotes year +4 and beyond). Country control variables include GDP 
per Capita, GDP Growth, and Creditor Rights Index dummies. Target controls include Target Market 
Value and Defense. Bidder controls include Toehold. Deal controls include Same Industry, Cross 
Border, Stock Payment, Multiple Bidders and Hostile. Industry-year and industry-country fixed 
effects are based on 13 macro industries defined by SDC. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and year	 (t-







Dependent Variable: Combined CAR [-3,+3] (in percentage points)

























Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes





Labor Restructuring Motivated Deals and EPL Reforms 
 
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of EPL reforms on the incidence 
of M&A deals motivated by labor restructuring. Four proxies for labor restructuring motivated deals 
are used. In Column (1), Business Overlap is a dummy equal to one if the bidder and the target are 
located in the same country and operate in the same industry (SIC4). In Column (2), High 
Productivity is a dummy equal to one if Target Abnormal Productivity is in the top tercile of the 
distribution, where Target Abnormal Productivity is the difference between labor efficiency of the 
target and the industry average prior to deal announcement. In Column (3), High Restructuring is a 
dummy equal to one if Industry Post-Merger Restructuring is in the top tercile of the distribution, 
where Industry Post-Merger Restructuring is the average workforce reduction in the target firm 
industry (SIC4) over the sample period. In Column (4), High Growth is a dummy equal to one if 
Growth is in the top tercile of the distribution, where Growth is the weighted-average growth in 
revenues in the target firm industry (SIC4) over prior three years. Country controls include GDP per 
Capita, GDP Growth, and Creditor Rights Index dummies. Target controls include Target Market 
Value and Defense. Bidder controls include Toehold. Deal controls include Same Industry, Cross 
Border, Stock Payment, Multiple Bidders and Hostile. Industry-year and industry-country fixed 
effects are based on 13 macro industries defined by SDC. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and year	 (t-






Dependent Variable: Business Overlap High Productivity High Restructuring High Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPL -0.02** 0.05** -0.02*** 0.03*
(-1.96) (2.54) (-3.10) (1.95)
Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes






Combined CAR and EPL Reforms – Triple Differences Analysis 
 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional/triple-differences analysis of the effect of EPL 
reforms on the combined firm CAR. Four cross-sectional dimensions are examined. In columns (1) 
and (2), Business Overlap is a dummy equal to one if the bidder and the target are located in the same 
country and operate in the same industry, and zero otherwise. In Columns (3) and (4) High 
Productivity is a dummy equal to one if Target Abnormal Productivity is in the top tercile of the 
distribution, where Target Abnormal Productivity is the difference between labor efficiency of the 
target and the industry average prior to deal announcement. In Columns (5) and (6), High 
Restructuring is a dummy equal to one if Industry Post-Merger Restructuring is in the top tercile of 
the distribution, where Industry Post-Merger Restructuring is the average workforce reduction in the 
target firm industry (SIC4) over the sample period.  In Columns (7) and (8), High Growth is a dummy 
equal to one if Growth is in the top tercile of the distribution, where Growth is the weighted-average 
growth in revenues in the target firm industry (SIC4) over prior three years. EPL is a reform indicator 
that is set to zero in 1985 and then increments by 1 (-1) each time the target firm country tightens 
(loosens) employment protection. Country control variables include GDP per Capita, GDP Growth, 
and Creditor Rights Index dummies. Industry-year and industry-country fixed effects are based on 13 
macro industries defined by SDC. All cross-sectional contrast variables (Business Overlap, High 
Productivity, High Restructuring, High Growth) are interacted with all sets of fixed effects and all 
control variables (hence base line effects of these variables are absorbed). All variables are defined in 
Appendix C. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and 






Dependent Variable: Combined CAR [-3,+3] (in percentage points)







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EPL x Business Overlap -3.01*** -3.27**
(-3.67) (-2.48)
EPL x High Productivity 2.27** 2.76***
(2.13) (3.03)
EPL x High Restructuring -2.69*** -2.42**
(-2.84) (-2.52)
EPL x High Growth 5.05*** 4.28***
(3.73) (3.28)
EPL -1.17** -3.29*** -1.37* -3.69***
(-2.09) (-3.56) (-1.73) (-4.63)
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country FE (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes







Division of Gains and EPL Reforms 
 
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of EPL reforms on the offer 
premium, target CAR [-3,+3] and bidder CAR [-3,+3]. All dependent variables are expressed in 
percentage points. Country controls include GDP per Capita, GDP Growth, and Creditor Rights 
Index dummies. Target, bidder and deal controls include Target Market Value, Defense, Toehold, 
Same Industry, Cross Border, Stock Payment, Multiple Bidders, Hostile, Public Target, and Public 
Bidder. Industry-year and industry-country fixed effects are based on 13 macro industries defined by 
SDC. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
double-clustered by country and year	 (t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 








Dependent Variable Offer Premium Target CAR [-3,+3] Bidder CAR [-3,+3]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPL -10.95*** -11.24*** -4.06** -4.00*** -0.45* -1.16***
(-3.62) (-4.52) (-2.37) (-2.95) (-1.86) (-2.86)
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Post-Merger Workforce Restructuring and EPL Reforms 
 
This table presents estimates of the effect of mergers on combined firm employment and the effect of 
EPL reforms on post-merger workforce restructuring. All deals are followed over a five-year window 
around completion of the transaction. The dependent variable is the (log) number of employees at the 
bidder and the target in year y+(-)i, where y is the year of completion of the merger, and +i (-i) is the 
number of years after (before) the deal. EPL is a reform indicator that is set to zero in 1985 and then 
increments by 1 (-1) each time the target firm country tightens (loosens) employment protection. Post 
Merger is a dummy equal to one if i is positive, and zero otherwise. Post_mergery+i is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the year is the ith year after the completion of the merger. Country controls include GDP per 
Capita, GDP Growth, and Creditor Rights Index dummies. Industry-year and industry-country fixed 
effects are based on 13 macro industries defined by SDC. Base line effects of EPL in Columns (2), (3) 
and (4), and of both EPL and Post Merger in Column (5) are absorbed by their interactions with fixed 
effects. Industry-year and industry-country fixed effects are based on 13 macro industries defined by 
SDC. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
double-clustered by deal and by year (t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 





Dependent Variable: Combined Number of Employees (Log)
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Merger -0.06*** -0.09***
(-4.87) (-6.82)
EPLx Post Merger 0.05*** 0.07**
(4.12) (2.06)
Post Merger y-1 0.01
(0.92)
Post Merger y-0 -0.09***
(-4.58)
Post Merger y+1 -0.09***
(-3.11)
Post Merger y+2 -0.12***
(-3.33)
EPL x Post Merger y-1 0.01
(1.00)
EPL x Post Merger y-0 0.06***
(2.86)
EPL x Post Merger y+1 0.06**
(2.28)
EPL x Post Merger y+2 0.06*
(1.79)
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
EPL x Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
EPL x Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Post Merger x Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes
Post Merger x Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes
N 24,775 24,775 24,775 24,775






M&A Volume / GDP vs. OECD EPL Index 
 
This figure presents the average volume of M&A deals (scaled GDP) by country relative to the 
average EPL index (as published by the OECD and corrected by Allard (2005)) over the 1985-2007 
period. The analysis is based on all deals reported in SDC. The slope and the R-squared correspond to 
a regression of the mean M&A volume to GDP on the mean EPL index across countries. The gray-








Appendix A – Macroeconomic Dynamics in the Run-up to EPL Reforms 
This table reports the analysis of macroeconomic dynamics in the two years prior to employment 
protection reforms. EPLy-1 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1(-1) if next year will see a 
reform tightening (loosening) employment protection, and zero otherwise. EPLy-2 is defined similarly 
except looking two years ahead. All other variables are expressed in percentage points (except GDP 
per Capita) and defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
double-clustered by country and year tests	 (t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 






















OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EPL y-1 -0.01 0.14 -0.40 0.38 -0.12 -5.18 -0.07
(-0.29) (0.30) (-1.32) (1.08) (-0.28) (-1.40) (-0.39)
EPL y-2 -0.01 0.27 -0.17 0.69 -0.15 -2.03 -0.18
(-0.41) (0.88) (-0.55) (1.09) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.87)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 483 483 483 399 391 483 475
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Appendix B - Robustness Tests 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests. In Panel B.1, the tests are performed 
excluding U.S. deals. In Panel B.2, the tests are performed on a larger sample including the post-2008 
period. In Panel B.3, the tests are performed using the continuous EPL index defined by the OECD 
and modified by Allard (2005). Deal volume and deal number regressions are weighted by the 
average number of listed firms in the country over the pre-treatment period. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and year for deal-level tests, and by 
industry-country and industry-year for country-level tests	(t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
B.1 - Excluding USA
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL -0.35*** -0.14*** -1.59**
(-3.00) (-3.04) (-2.80)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 2,708 2,708 2,266
B.2 - Including Post-2008 period
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL -0.27*** -0.14*** -1.51**
(-3.65) (-3.58) (-2.43)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4,837 4,837 8,634
B.3 - Using OECD EPL Index
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPLOECD -0.32*** -0.14*** -3.22***
(-3.05) (-2.68) (-4.35)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,646 3,646 7,129
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Appendix B (Cont'd)- Robustness Tests 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests. In Panel B.4, the tests are performed 
including additional control variables for the political / macro-economic environment in the target 
country. In Panel B.5, the tests are performed excluding countries with no EPL reforms during the 
sample period. Deal volume and deal number regressions are weighted by the average number of 
listed firms in the country over the pre-treatment period. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and year for deal-level tests, and by industry-
country and industry-year for country-level tests	 (t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ 




B.4 - With additional controls for political  / macro-economic factors
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL -0.25*** -0.12*** -2.52***
(-3.17) (-3.15) (-4.65)
Gini -0.01 0.00 0.1
(-1.21) (-0.63) (0.94)
Left Government -0.1 0.15** -3.79***
(-0.67) (2.07) (-4.47)
Right Governement -0.31** 0.05 -3.74***
(-2.12) (0.68) (-4.03)
Union Density 0.00 -0.01 0.06
(-0.22) (-0.96) (0.34)
Proportionality -0.30** -0.09 -1.77
(-2.29) (-1.53) (-0.76)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.63 -0.56 -10.45
(-0.89) (-1.51) (-1.13)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,646 3,646 7,129
B.5 - Excluding countries with no EPL Reforms over the 1985-2007 period
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL -0.31*** -0.16*** -1.35*
(-3.59) (-3.70) (-2.09)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 2,549 2,549 5,650
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Appendix B (Cont'd) - Robustness Tests 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests. In Panel B.6, the tests are performed 
excluding EPL reforms focusing on temporary contracts. In Panel B.7 the “placebo” EPL indicator is 
defined based on the reforms in the neighboring country. In Panel B.8 the “placebo” EPL indicator is 
defined based on a statistical model predicting EPL reforms using lagged GDP growth, GDP per 
capita, Gini coefficient, union density, voting proportionality, corporate tax rate, and dummies for left 
and right governments (see Section IV.E for details). Deal volume and deal number regressions are 
weighted by the average number of listed firms in the country over the pre-treatment period. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and double-clustered by country and year for deal-level tests, 
and by industry-country and industry-year for country-level tests	(t-statistics in parentheses). Symbols ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
	
 
B.6 - Excluding EPL Reforms focusing on temporary contracts
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL -0.29*** -0.16*** -2.00***
(-3.40) (-3.98) (-4.20)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,646 3,646 7,129
B.7 - Placebo using the neighboring country as the treated country
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL 0.02 -0.02 0.47
(0.53) (-0.28) (1.19)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,646 3,646 7,129
B.8 - Placebo using fake reforms predicted by political / macro-economic factors
Dependent Variable Deal Volume Deal Number Comb CAR [-3;+3]
EPL 0.02 0.07 0.20
(0.61) (1.11) (0.88)




Industry x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry x Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3,646 3,646 7,129
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Appendix C - List of Variables (in alphabetical order) 
 
Variable Definition 
Business Overlap Dummy equal to one if the bidder and the target are located in the same 
country and operate in the same SIC4 industry, zero otherwise 
Bidder Market Value (log) Natural logarithm of Bidder Market Value (M$) 
Bidder Market Value (M$) Bidder market value prior to deal announcement in M$ 
CAR Bidder [-3;+3] Bidder cumulative abnormal return over a seven-day window around the deal 
announcement. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model 
relative to a local equity market index (CRSP for U.S. stocks, the local stock 
market equity index reported by Datastream for non-U.S. stocks)     
CAR Combined [-3;+3] Weighted average of the target and the bidder cumulative abnormal returns. 
The weights are the market values of the target and the bidder four days prior 
to the announcement 
CAR Target [-3;+3] Target cumulative abnormal return over a seven-day window around the deal 
announcement. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model 
relative to a local equity market index (CRSP for U.S. stocks, the local stock 
market equity index reported by Datastream for non-U.S. stocks) 
Change in Stock Market Index Target country’s main equity index return from Datastream 
Combined Number of 
Employees 
Total number of employees of the target and bidding companies (in logs) 
Completed Dummy equal to one if the deal was completed, and zero otherwise 
Corporate Tax Rate Official corporate tax rate in the target country  
Creditor Rights Creditor Rights Index as from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) 
Cross Border Dummy equal to one if the target and the bidder involved have their 
headquarters located in different countries, and zero otherwise 
Deal Value (log) Natural logarithm of Deal Value (M$) 
Deal Value (M$) Deal value in M$ 
Defense  Dummy equal to one if a defense mechanism was used by the target, and zero 
otherwise 
EPL EPL is an indicator variable that increases (decreases) by one whenever a 
major reform aimed at increasing (reducing) employment protection is 
adopted in the target firm country during the year. This variable is defined 
recursively as in Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2015). In 1985, the EPL score is 
set to zero for all countries 
EPLOECD Continuous measure of employment protection as defined by OECD and 
modified for consistency by Allard (2005)  
EPLPositive EPLPositive is an indicator variable that increments by one whenever a major 
reform aimed at increasing employment protection is adopted during the year 
in the target firm country. In 1985, the EPLPositive score is set to zero for all 
countries 
EPLNegative EPLNegative is an indicator variable that increments by one whenever a major 
reform aimed at reducing employment protection is adopted during the year in 
the target firm country. In 1985, the EPLNegative score is set to zero for all 
countries 
GDP Growth GDP growth in the target country as reported by the IMF 
GDP Per Capita  Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in the target country as reported by 
the IMF 
Gini Gini coefficient in the target country as reported by the OECD	
Government Bond Yield Long-term sovereign bond yield in the target country from IMF 
Growth Weighted-average growth in revenues in the target firm industry over the last 
three years (by SIC4)	
High Growth Dummy equal to one if Growth is in the top tercile of the distribution, and 
zero otherwise 
High Productivity Dummy equal to one if Target Abnormal Productivity is in the top tercile of 
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the distribution, and zero otherwise 
High Restructuring Dummy equal to one if Industry Post-Merger Restructuring is in the top 
tercile of the distribution, and zero otherwise 
Hostile Dummy equal to one if the initial bid was hostile, and zero otherwise 
Left Government Dummy equal to one if the governing party is a left-wing party, and zero 
otherwise 
Multiple Bidders Dummy equal to one if more than one bidder is involved, and zero otherwise 
Offer Premium Offer price relative to target stock price four weeks prior to deal 
announcement as reported by SDC 
Post-Merger Workforce 
Change 
Average post-merger change in the number of employees in the target industry 
(by SIC4). The change in the number of employees is the number of 
employees at the bidding firm one year after the completion of the deal 
relative to the combined number of employees at the bidder and the target one 
year prior 
Proportionality Proportionality index measuring the degree of proportionality of the electoral 
system in the target country 
Public Bidder Dummy equal to one if the bidder is a public company, and zero otherwise 
Public Firms RoA Average return on assets (net income before exceptional items scaled by total 
assets) of all listed firms in a country-year from Global Compustat 
(Compustat for the U.S.) 
Public Target Dummy equal to one if the target is a public company, and zero otherwise  
Private Consumption Growth Target firm country year-on-year change in private final consumption in 
constant prices from OECD 
Right Government Dummy equal to one if the governing party is a right-wing party, and zero 
otherwise 
Same Industry Dummy equal to one if the bidder and the target and both operate in one of the 
89 mid-industries defined by SDC 
Stock Payment Dummy equal to one if 100% of the proposed payment is in stock, and zero 
otherwise  
Target Abnormal Productivity Productivity ratio of the target relative to the industry (SIC4) average one year 
prior to deal announcement. Productivity ratio is defined as total revenues in 
thousands of dollars divided by the total number of employees. 
Target Market Value (log) Natural logarithm of the Target Market Value (M$) 
Target Market Value (M$) Target market value prior to deal announcement in M$ 
Toehold Percentage ownership of the target by the bidder prior to initiating the bid 
Unemployment Rate Target country unemployment rate as reported by IMF 
Union Density Target country trade union density reported by the OECD. Percentage of 
employees who are members of a trade union 
  
  
	
